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ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes a corpus of political rhetoric to identify the rationale for Ontario’s
financial literacy education (FLE) policy decisions that came about in the wake of the 2008 global
financial crisis. The complex politics of FLE were shaped and legitimized by special-interest
coalitions’ mobilization of power, characterized by unsubstantiated claims about its efficacy. The
rhetoric amounted to ‘truthiness’ over argumentation through the neglect of empirical evidence.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Politics play a crucial role in educational policy. Education is always “subject to the
vicissitudes of the political process” (Levin, 2009, p. 69) in which the definitions of
policy problems and their solutions are “necessarily ambiguous” (Bridgman &
Barry, 2002, p. 159). To arrive at better education policy, researchers and policy
analysts must explore the arguments underlying public policy, and to uncover how
their assumptions function within political rhetoric – that is, within the corpus of
speeches, proclamations and policy statements in which such arguments are
presented. The recent debate about financial literacy in education policy provides an
example where many of the assumptions on which the political rhetoric rests are
subject to serious, and perhaps typical, shortcomings.
While a “faint cry” for financial literacy education “had been audible for
decades” (Willis, 2008a, p. 2), its volume was amplified in the wake of the 2008
global financial crisis, resulting in swift government action to mandate K-12
financial literacy policy. In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, financial
literacy education received increased political attention worldwide as an important
policy solution to achieve a variety of ends. The OECD stated,
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, financial education issues have
reached a momentum and financial literacy has gained international recognition as
a critical life skill for individuals. In this respect, more and more countries are
developing tailored financial education strategies and programmes, are introducing
financial education into the school curriculum and designing dedicated learning
frameworks (OECD, 2011, p. 2).
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This paper examines how key arguments advocating financial literacy education
policy were shaped and legitimized more by the values of special-interest coalitions’
and the mobilization of their power - in particular arguments resting on claims
about the ability of financial literacy education to solve national and regional
economic problems and inferences about its efficacy. These arguments rested on
little more than ‘truthiness’ (that is, claims of knowing something intuitively without
regard for evidence, logic, or facts), rather than on the application of serious
reasoning and the consideration empirical evidence. By analyzing such a corpus of
political rhetoric, this paper attempts to identify the rationale offered for financial
literacy policy decisions, and seeks to highlight serious shortcomings in the
argumentation found there. The data I will analyse will confirm former Deputy
Minister Benjamin Levin’s observation that “for politicians, what people believe to
be true is much more important than what may be true in fact” (2005, p. 19). Finally,
the paper explores strategies to counter ‘truthiness’ in the debate about education
policy issues by offering instead approaches to argumentation that might have a
healthy impact on policy production.
2. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
The OECD has been a major force in advocating financial literacy education
worldwide since it launched its Financial Education Project in 2003 (Smith, 2005).
The 2008 global financial crisis created a sense of political urgency about financial
literacy education policy (OECD, 2011), even though prior attention had already
focused on the development of such curricula by a number of G20 nations. In some
cases, financial literacy education was overtly tied to larger economic problems. For
example, in the US, “Some of the country's economic woes might have been
prevented if students were taught financial literacy” (Koranda, 2009). United States
Representative Gene Whisnant stated, “You don't have to look very far for relevancy
to see the bad decisions consumers made with these subprime loans. Financial
literacy is very important in our society. The education system needs to find some
way to provide that” (Loew, 2009).
As global political attention to financial literacy increased, so did the push for
its measurement and quantification. The OECD announced that the first large-scale
international study to assess financial literacy among 15-year-olds would
commence in 2012 and be included within the Programme for International
Students Assessment (PISA). This action might result in further political attention to
the issue once international scores begin to be released, as had occurred with other
long-standing components of PISA (e.g., literacy, science and mathematics rankings).
This paper is concerned specifically with financial literacy education in
Canada and Ontario, where the call for it was politically prominent. While Canada
was affected by the 2008 global financial crisis through slower economic growth,
tightened credit policy and losses in the S&P/TSX, the negative effects were far less
pronounced than in other OECD countries (Durocher, 2008; Porter, 2010), even
though personal bankruptcies had increased by approximately 4% in 2008 over the
previous year (HRSDC, 2011). Notably, Canada was the only G7 country that avoided
a government bank bailout, and it was ranked first of 134 countries on the
2

LAURA ELIZABETH PINTO
soundness of its banks (Porter, 2010). Canada’s ability to weather the 2008 crisis
with less impact than other developed countries was, in part, due to its more
stringent regulation of the financial sector (Durocher, 2008).
Despite Canada’s relative economic success in 2008, overt connections
between financial literacy and the economy were made. For example, one media
report proclaimed that “after the 2008 market crash, the federal government
realized people needed help with spending, saving, investing and borrowing. The
federal government apparently had concerns about Canadians “taking on more debt
during the recession and suffering when low interest rates started climbing again’”
(Roseman, 2010, p. 2). Roseman (2010) reported that this concern led to the
development of financial literacy education policies. In Ontario, the Minister of
Education indicated in an interview that growing debt and “reckless personal
spending” prompted the province to pursue financial literacy education policy
(Brown, 2009).
The perceived political importance of financial literacy education as a
solution to issues of economic prosperity led to action on the part of the Canadian
federal government, through Minister of Finance Jim Flaherty, to establish a Task
Force on Financial Literacy in 2009. Because the federal government does not have
jurisdiction over education policy, it rarely undertakes initiatives related to
education. Financial literacy education was one of the few exceptions in the past
decade. Members were appointed to the Task Force on Financial Literacy, though
the composition the Task Force was criticized. The chair of the task force was the
chief executive officer of Sun Life Financial, a private-sector organization. Its vicechair was the chairman of a major bank. The other eleven members included
educators, consultants, financial advisers and journalists. Only one member of the
group, an executive director of a nonprofit credit counselling service, had direct
experience working with people who live in poverty and/or struggle financially. The
Task Force, criticized for poorly-publicized public “consultations”, was described as
operating “under cover” and purposely keeping a low profile (Kirby, 2010). At the
same time, the Task Force created an official space for discussion about financial
literacy, paving the way for “forum politics” (Radaelli, 1999, p. 679) that allowed a
powerful group to initiate and gate-keep discussion. Similarly, Ontario initiated
provincial task force consultations that took place quietly and with little publicity
until after the release of its report, although it also offered a localized place for
forum politics to occur.
The national Task Force released a report in 2010, entitled Report of
recommendations on financial literacy: Canadians and their money: Building a
brighter financial future. The report defined financial literacy as: “having the
knowledge, skills and confidence to make responsible financial decisions” (2010, p.
10). Two of the national Task Force’s thirty recommendations for a national strategy
addressed to the work of provincial Ministries of Education.
The Ontario Ministry of Education began working towards such a curriculum
prior to the completion of the national Task Force report, first with a release of a
provincial Report of the Working Group on Financial Literacy titled A Sound
Investment, Financial Literacy Education in Ontario Schools (2010) – a document that
supported the Federal Task Force’s recommendations for compulsory financial
3
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literacy education in the K-12 school system. In July 2011, The Ontario Ministry of
Education released two policy documents in response to the Report of the Working
Group on Financial Literacy: Financial Literacy, Grades 4-8: Scope and Sequence of
Expectations and Financial Literacy, Grades 9–12: Scope and Sequence of
Expectations. These two documents were an aggregation of any existing learning
outcomes from the “official” curriculum that had a direct or indirect connection to
financial literacy and represented a first phase of policy action, with the rest to be
completed in 2012. In total, the Ministry committed $1.9 million to the development
of subsequent K-12 financial literacy resources and professional learning
opportunities for teachers in support of the implementation of the first two Scope
and Sequence documents.
3. METHODS
As the context just described suggests, the politics surrounding financial literacy are
extensive, but also complex. I collected documentary evidence of the financial
literacy education debate in the form of newspaper articles, speech transcripts,
transcripts of debates in the Ontario Legislative Assembly, and official reports. Sixtyeight newspaper articles were analyzed, obtained by a search for the keyword
“financial literacy” in the Proquest Canadian Newsstand database, and narrowed to
include all of those that addressed financial literacy education between January
2008 (the start of the period of global financial crisis) and August 2011. I also
included two government reports pertaining to financial literacy: the federal Task
Force on Financial Literacy’s (Report of recommendations on financial literacy:
Canadians and their money: Building a brighter financial future (2010), and
Ontario’s Report of the Working Group on Financial Literacy entitled A Sound
Investment, Financial Literacy Education in Ontario Schools (also 2010). I reviewed
transcripts from the Legislative Assembly of Ontario for the time period studied, and
identified discussions at the provincial level that had to do with financial literacy
education. Finally, I included three speeches given by Canadian Minister of Finance
Jim Flaherty during the timeframe studied, each of which addressed the issue of
financial literacy education. By drawing on these varied data sources, I was able to
triangulate arguments in the political rhetoric.
Source
Toronto Star
Globe & Mail
National Post
Windsor Star
Edmonton Journal
Montreal Gazette
Vancouver Sun
Ottawa Citizen
The Province
Calgary Herald
Winnipeg Free Press
Total (newspapers)

Number of items reviewed
17
13
13
5
4
4
4
3
2
2
1
68
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Source
Speeches
Reports
Legislative Hansard

Number of items reviewed
3
2
2

Table 1: Summary of the Corpus of Texts
For the purpose of interpretive analysis, I treated the corpus of texts
holistically, since deconstructing data into discrete pieces or using quantitative
coding methods can lead to misinterpretation (Mello, 2002). Rather, I employed
Mello’s (2002) cognitive perception approach, applying collocation to multiple
sources of data within the broader political environment and simultaneously
identifying textual, transactual, and socio-cultural operations (Mello, 2002). In doing
so, I applied a grounded theory approach (Morrell, 2006), consistent with Fischer’s
(2003) methodological suggestions for interpretative analysis. I began by reviewing
the texts collected as a whole, reading and re-reading in order to identify arguments
in an inductive and interpretive fashion.
I also used collocation analysis to identify unique, recurrent semantic devices
(Mello, 2002). I did this in two ways. First, I applied qualitative interpretation by
reading and highlighting documents. I further ran all text files through a corpus
linguistics research software tool AntConc 3.2.4 to verify my interpretation, since
the software would identify collocations that I may have missed. I also searched for
schemes and tropes operating within the data sources, with particular attention to
the trope of metaphor as a rhetorical device shaping arguments (Morrell, 2006).
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The first instance of a statement about financial literacy education in the timeframe
studied occurred on May 8, 2008, within a speech by Minister of Finance Jim
Flaherty (Flaherty, 2008). Prior to reports of that speech, there had been no press
reports in 2008 concerning financial literacy. Some media outlets picked up on the
Minister’s statement, and by May 12, 2008, financial literacy education began to
make its way into print news media. By 2010, the Ontario Ministry of Education
established its Working Group on Financial Literacy to clarify the meaning of
financial literacy and make recommendations for provincial curriculum policy. As
the reports of the federal Task Force and Ontario’s provincial Working Group were
released, the frequency of news stories concerning financial literacy education
increased, many of which were in response to Task Force and Working Group
recommendations. In Ontario’s provincial legislature, the creation of financial
literacy policy received some attention in debates among Members of Provincial
Parliament (MPPs). Given that many of the news stories, and much of the public
debate, were based on government proclamations, it appears public discourse was
initiated by the federal government, and was subsequently picked up by media
outlets. This is consistent with prior research that points to the media’s role as a
political conduit (Shanahan, McBeth, Hathaway, & Arnell, 2008).
All documents in the corpus ultimately share an important point of
commonality: they position financial literacy education as an important and
5
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legitimate policy solution to the problem of economic instability. As one journalist
pointed out, “The noble goal of boosting financial literacy is like motherhood or
apple pie: You won't find many bad-mouthing it” (Chevreau, 2011, p. FP10). This
strong statement is an example of the extent to which political rhetoric elevated
financial literacy education to “sacred cow” status, since all texts in the corpus
advocated some form of financial literacy education.
Despite financial literacy education’s apparent and pervasive sacred cow
status, two different (but related) arguments emerged about its goal, about what
and whose perspectives ought to set that goal, and about what sorts of policy
solutions might achieve it. The data analysis revealed two different groups who
were putting forth a total of four arguments in various public discourses.
The first group, which was made up of financial industry representatives and
politicians at the federal and provincial levels, argued that financial literacy
education policy was urgently needed. This first conclusion (I will call it 1a) was
based on three premises.
First, that Canada was experiencing a “crisis” of “risks to financial well-being
posed by financial illiteracy” (Task Force, 2010), leaving not only individuals but the
entire economy in peril. : “Recent economic events have brought into relief the
serious risks to financial well-being posed by financial illiteracy,” the federal Task
Force (2010, p. 13) stated. The word “crisis” appeared a total of thirteen times in the
corpus of newspaper articles. The crisis premiss was based on three pieces of data:
(1) Canadians had taken on too much debt; (2) Canadians had not saved enough as a
group; and (3) Bankruptcies increased by 22% over the previous year.
Second that poverty can be attributed to financial illiteracy. Canadians,
according to this premiss, simply lacked the skills, knowledge and behaviours to
participate effectively in the economy. Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty (who
established the federal Task Force) pronounced in a speech at the Conference on
Financial Education in Washington, DC: “We are graduating people who can design
and build complex buildings and bridges, but cannot effectively manage their
personal finances” (Flaherty, 2008). This statement used synecdoche to support the
argument by concretizing the problem, and, as Stone (2002) has argued, to suspend
critical thinking. The image of the engineer who cannot manage her own money is a
powerful synecdoche, and one that garners the attention of the listener through
pointing out a flaw in the education system. The engineer example also underscores
the ideal of individual action – a theme that appears in other texts. For example,
journalist Andrew Allentuck uses rhetorical questioning as a device to individualize
the problem:
You find yourself deep in debt and you can't get out. Who is responsible? Is it the
financial institution who handed you the rope you used to hang yourself? Or should
you be looking in the mirror?

In this quote, the “blame” was clearly shifted away from the financial institutions,
and placed squarely on the person in the mirror. This part of the political argument
tied individual financial literacy to national economic strength as a reason for its
importance: “improving the financial decisions made by Canadians will make our
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economy stronger” (Task Force, 2010) since, as federal Minister of Finance Jim
Flaherty pointed out, “our economy is built on millions of everyday financial
decisions by Canadians” (Stewart & Menard, 2011, p. B13). This part of the
argument fell into the trap of the fallacy of composition in that it ignores the crucial
role of financial systems in producing economic outcomes, instead erroneously
overlooking “the structuring influences on individual action which are inherent to
capitalism” (Arthur, 2011, p. 194).
A third and final premiss of the argument for 1a then attempted to tie
increased financial literacy to individual prosperity for all Canadians and Ontarians.
Ontario Member of Provincial Parliament (MPP) Charles Sousa, in the Legislative
Assembly, stated, “I believe financial literacy plays a role in reducing poverty in
Ontario. We want consumers and those most vulnerable to have better choices so
that there will be fewer people in financial difficulty” (House Hansard, 2009).
Defenders of this premiss also asserted that Canadians and Ontarians had
taken on too much debt and failed to sufficiently save money because of their lack of
knowledge, leaving them in peril. This part of the argument relied on the repetition
of several studies as a means of persuasion, which were mentioned in speeches and
in the media. First, the media reported several times that the 2009 Statistics Canada
Canadian Financial Capability Survey showed that Canadians were not performing
well with respect to personal finances: for every $100 of income, Canadians owed
$150 in debt. The report was quoted as saying that bankruptcies increased by 22%
over the previous year. These data were used within newspaper articles, sometimes
to offer added support when reporting Ministerial and Task Force statements.
In addition, newspapers often cited a Harris/Decima poll – conducted on
behalf of the Canadian Institute of Charted Accountants (CICA) – which found that
85% of Canadians believed financial literacy education in schools could help youth
be more prepared to manage their money upon entering the workforce. This was
part of an attempt to appeal to “objective” facts as a reason to address financial
literacy – the data describe the perception that individuals continue to make poor
choices, and that Canadians can overcome these poor choices via education. The
framing of the statistics was such that citizens were presented as “victims” of a lack
of knowledge that was not (but should be) addressed in schools. Fischer (2003) and
Stone (2002) have argued that the use of statistics in this way is “numbers as
metaphors” (Fischer, 2003, p. 170).
In short, the argument for 1a implied that by providing financial literacy
education to Canadians, the federal and provincial governments could save the day
by empowering citizens in peril to make their way out of a bad situation. As the
president of the Canadian Banker Association states in a February 16, 2010 National
Post piece
Those working for banks across the country are experts in financial matters and are
eager to work with governments and other stakeholders to help improve the
financial literacy of all Canadians, empowering people to make informed decisions
and take control of their financial future.

Similarly, Minister of Finance Flaherty was quoted as emphasizing the need for
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“collaboration with other levels of government and the private sector” (Roseman,
2011, p. B4). These quotations placed an emphasis on “partnership” between
government, the financial services industry and the education sector (Task Force,
2010). By positioning the industry as able to “fix” individual problems, that industry
was absolved of any responsibility for economic problems to which it may have
contributed.
A second argument put forth by financial industry representatives and
politicians concluded that (1b) literacy education policy should be developed and
enacted through a financial industry and government partnership. It based this
conclusion on the premiss that industry held the expert knowledge required to
create such a curriculum.
In addition to these arguments put forth by financial industry
representatives and politicians, two additional arguments appeared in data. These
last two arguments were put forth by several prominent journalists (Ellen Roseman,
James Daw, Jonathan Chevreau), the non-profit Investor Education Fund (IEF), and
the Canadian Community Reinvestment Coalition, an Ottawa-based bank watchdog
group.
The first of this second group of arguments concluded (2a) that, while
financial literacy education might be valuable, it ought to be developed without
industry involvement.
This argument rested principally on the premise that the financial sector and
government representatives at the helm of policy and curriculum production were
elites who “played a role in the losses Canadians suffered in the recession” – in other
words, these “foxes in the chicken coop” were liable to misinform Canadians.
Presentations of the argument for 2b usually began with a proclamation of support
for financial literacy, immediately followed by criticism of the special interests
responsible for the dominant narrative, calling for “populist leadership” (Roseman,
2010, p. 2) in lieu of industry insiders. For example,
Now I am as much in favour of financial literacy as the next guy. I could use more.
But I thought it was pretty clear that the financial sector's opportunistic lending
practices and complicated, morally bankrupt investment products ruined
everything. If so, then what possible benefit from literacy enhancement can we
expect from a task force sponsored by government and headed by two top financial
executives? (Daw, 2009, p. B2)

Proponents of this argument accused members of the Task Force and Working
Group as being elites who were out of touch with Canadians “from all walks of life
and socio-economic levels” (Goar, 2010, p. A19). This contradicted the first
argument’s characterization of the “crusaders” who would solve economic
problems. Proponents of the argument for 2b repeatedly pointed out that members
of the Task Force were industry insiders who “played a role in the losses Canadians
suffered in the recession” (Goar, 2010, p. A19), and were simply opportunistic
entrepreneurs who profit from financial illiteracy as “Canadians are chiselled and
misled by giant financial institutions whose ability to dream up sneaky fees and
hidden expenses are enough to defeat even a PhD in financial literacy” (Bryan, 2010,
p. E2).
8
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Further, those arguing for 2a went to say, “financial industry profits are made
on the backs of illiterates” (Chevreau, 2010, p. FP10), thus calling into question the
motivation of the elites to eliminate financial illiteracy. The vilification of industry
members was overtly described in colourful and metaphorical terms in one news
item, comparing the Task Force report to:
the soothing words of the foxes, spoken upon taking command of the chicken
coop…The big financial service providers profit from financial illiteracy, whether in
the form of bank fees and service charges or in the form of 'advice' disguised as sales
pitches for their own products (Chevreau, 2010, p. FP10).

This particular article concluded with an especially powerful metaphor in direct
response to the Task Force report’s content: “the foxes must be licking their lips”
(Chevreau, 2010, p. FP10). While this metaphor appeared in the one article, it is
universally applicable as an organizing descriptor for the argument as a whole.
Presentations of the argument for 2a often used emotional appeals;
conveying injustice in the selection of Task Force members, and the fact that their
privileged and industry-insider status was reflected in the national report. The
argument was presented through colourful linguistic tropes constructed using
words such as: outrage, suspicion, sneaky, opportunistic, frustrating, and fleeced. To
further this point, advocates of the argument offered examples and stories to
underscore the idea that no amount of financial literacy could address industry or
systemic issues beyond consumers’ control. For instance, one suggested, “remind
the government that appointed you how little point there is in being financially
literate if you wind up at age 60 or 65 discovering that much of your company
pension has just evaporated in a bankruptcy proceeding” (Bryan, 2010, p. E2).
Another premiss in the argument for 2a called the effectiveness of financial
literacy education into question, quoting researcher Lauren Willis, and moving to a
partial attack on the evidence behind the policy solution proposed by the first group
- a solution which presupposed the efficacy of financial literacy education in schools.
Economic woes aside, proponents of this argument presented quotes from “experts”
who argued that financial literacy programs were ineffective and amount to “little
more than a political guise designed to quell calls for more government regulation of
the financial sector” (Trichur, 2009, p. B1), thus debunking the Task Force’s policy
solution.
Like the first group of arguments (for 1a and 1b), this argument for 2a also
relied on selected statistical data, affirming the use of numbers as metaphors
(consistent with Fischer, 2003; Stone, 2002). One article (Daw, 2009, p. B2), for
instance, quoted American researcher Lauren Willis who claims that no evidence
exists to support financial literacy education’s efficacy, and that such educational
effort “dupes consumers into thinking they can master the financial services market,
while placing blame upon them for their failure to do so, deflecting political
pressure for change.” Yet another media source quoted Willis: “When consumers
find themselves in dire financial straits, the regulation through education model
blames them for their plight, shaming them and deflecting calls for effective market
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regulation. Requiring consumers to act as their own financial experts is socially
inefficient” (Trichur, 2009, p. B1).
The final argument put forth by this second group concluded that (2b)
stricter industry regulation – not financial literacy education – was a better policy
solution for the “economic crisis.” This conclusion was based on the premiss that
macro and individual economic problems (poverty, debt, inadequate savings) are
equally or more a consequence of reckless industry action that would be better
addressed through regulation.
Thos arguing for 2b typically expressed the hope that policy-makers would
shift their focus to better regulation in an environment stacked against the interests
of individuals. Journalist Rob Carrick pointed out potential problems of having
industry involved in financial literacy education:
…if we're going to have a financially literate society, we need to understand that making
people smarter means they're going to ask more questions. When they do, they'll be up
against a financial industry that is as much a part of the financial literacy problem in
Canada as the solution (Carrick, 2011, p. B13).

While this second group of arguments served as a cautionary tale for Canadians to
be wary of financial literacy education as a guise for something else, it failed to offer
a concrete and a coherent alternate policy solution in place of the Task Force’s
curriculum.
4.1 The problem of truthiness: over-simplification instead of evidence-based policy
Despite calls for evidence-based policy (see, for example, Boswell, Geddes &
Scholten, 2011; Cooper, Levin & Campbell, 2009; Slavin, 2008), reliance on popular
pressure, common-sense wisdom, and values has been well-documented as a
feature of politics and policy-making (Boswell, Geddes & Scholten, 2011; Stone,
2002). The arguments just described rely on “truthiness” (a term coined by Stephen
Colbert, referring the “attachment to one’s opinions because they ‘feel right’
potentially leading to harmful action or inaction,” Narvaez, 2010, p. 163) over
evidence to justify policy solutions. The “common sense” reasoning, especially
evident in the argument made for 1a, suggests a clear, linear and over-simplified
political response to the threat of financial instability. In particular, that argument
offered a few (unjustified) causal links: first, that economic problems are a result of
individual financial “misbehaviour” (e.g., too much debt, not enough savings);
second, that the “misbehaviour” is a direct result of lack of knowledge; and third,
that education would increase knowledge which in turn would decrease
“misbehaviour.”
In this “truthy” over-simplification, a certain part of the story never gets told
by the popular political rhetoric. If such arguments had taken a rational approach to
their construction, they might have attempted to accurately convey the causes of
national and global instability as the core of the problem, and to offer policy
solutions that address those causes.
First, the “common sense” social implications of financial literacy are
portrayed as levelling the playing field for individual wealth accumulation through
education alone (Burk, 2009; Van Wageningen, 2011). This over-simplification is
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one of many examples of symbolic condensation. Contrary to “truthy” claims made
in the arguments described, a successful social policy of financial literacy education
would need to be far more complex. In a very general sense, literacy is a socially
constructed activity that both contributes to creating the reality in which it operates
and is simultaneously influenced by that reality; “each has a part in the construction
of the other” (Gee, 1990, p. 5). Thus, an examination of any form of literacy –
including financial literacy – requires consideration of how it operates within social
contexts, and how the social contexts influence (and are influenced by) individuals’
understandings. Without attention to such issues, financial literacy education is at
risk of replicating inequities, and contributing to the continued marginalization of
already vulnerable populations - just the opposite of the outcomes endorsed in the
political rhetoric (Arthur, 2011). This speaks to the role that researchers can and
should continue to play through continued inquiry about the nature of financial
literacy education programmes and resources, as well as their outcomes.
Second, turning to the nature and findings of the available research might
have led to significantly different policy solutions, especially on the part of the
Ontario Ministry of Education. The OECD itself attributed the financial crisis to
global macro policies affecting liquidity (low interest rates, fixed exchange rates,
and liquidity reservoirs) and to a “very poor regulatory framework” especially in the
area of mortgages and off-balance-sheet activity (Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson & Lee,
2008, p. 2), not to lack of individual knowledge as stated in the argument for 1a
described earlier. Together, such policies together with inadequate regulation
caused macroeconomic weakness, economic imbalance, over-leverage and credit
risks that ultimately resulted in the global crisis. Plainly put, lenders became greedy,
and nothing was in place to stop them from aggressively selling credit to individuals
and corporations who were credit risks. While one might argue that individual
decisions to take on risky debt might have contributed to the problems, this is more
a consequence of the underlying causes outlined by the OECD, and is not necessarily
a primary cause. Interestingly, this type of evidence could have been used to the
benefit of the argument for 2a, but that would have required revising the conception
of financial literacy, thus jeopardizing its sacred cow status. As well,
acknowledgement of evidence-based factors would have necessitated an
exploration of different policy solutions. That is to say, if the cause of instability is
poor regulation, then the solution would involve regulatory reform, not education
policy.
The selected statistics about Canadians used to define the problem (high
levels of consumer debt, low levels of financial knowledge) avoided data about
financial literacy education itself. “Success” in financial literacy is, of course,
dependent upon what criteria are used to measure it and the form that the
educational intervention takes. Evidence about the efficacy of financial literacy
education in K-12 education with respect to retention and application of curriculum
content remains contested. Whereas the body of research published to date tips in
support of Willis’ (2008a, 2008b) position that it is ineffective with respect to
adolescent students’ immediate comprehension (see, for example, Mandell &
Hanson, 2009; Peng, Bartholomae, Fox, & Cravener, 2007) and on subsequent adult
behaviour (see, for example, Cole & Shastry, 2009; Mandell & Hanson, 2009;
11
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McCormick 2009;), a few small-scale studies have reported success in immediate
learning (see, for example, Pang, 2010; Sherraden, Johnson, Guo & Elliott, 2011).
Others reported mixed results depending on specific contextual factors with respect
to adolescents’ comprehension and immediate use (Danes & Haberman, 2007;
Walstad, Rebeck & MacDonald, 2010).
Despite the many and strong criticisms calling attention to the inefficacy of
financial literacy education among adolescents – especially in the many quotes
attributed to Lauren Willis (2008a, 2008b) in the corpus – not one text in the corpus
supporting the arguments for 2a and 2b suggested that it should be flatly eliminated
or even its sacred cow status be called into question. Thus, reasoning in those
arguments as well was weak and contradictory: it supported a policy solution that it
disproved of, without making any attempt to resolve this apparent contradiction.
All four arguments considered above failed to use evidence effectively and
accurately. For example, the political rhetoric in the argument for 1a failed to
venture beyond selected, perfunctory bits of empirical evidence, ignoring data on
Canada’s economic standing and individual financial outcomes in comparison to
other OECD and G7 countries; and failed to acknowledge other, serious and
empirically sound data on the factors contributing to the 2008 financial crisis (e.g.,
the OECD rationale just stated, and Canada’s relative economic strength described
earlier in this paper).
Finally, the nuances and complexities of global, national, and provincial
economic problems and systemic factors were lost in the truthiness of the symbolic
condensation (see, for example, Arthur, 2011). The arguments presented here oversimplified the core problem, and shut down broader discussion about alternative
policy solutions while ignoring research and evidence. Rather than drawing
effectively on evidence to discern the cause of the problems, and the efficacy of
possible solutions, the arguments illustrate the power of the use of rhetorical
flourishes and metaphor to define issues and legitimize policy options.
5. CONCLUSION
It seems that financial literacy education is inevitable, particularly in light of its
inclusion in PISA, and it will be shaped not by evidence, but rather by the values,
self-interest, mobilization efforts, and lobbying power of participants in the political
arena as evidenced in the narratives presented. Given the immense political
pressure to address economic issues through public policy, a move to link individual
financial action with national prosperity provides a political rationale to shape (and
possibly deflect) policy problems to individuals. By focusing on the crusade,
governments are perceived to be addressing problems of economic instability,
without having to resort to economic policy shifts.
By calling attention to the increased political emphasis on financial literacy in
K-12 education, international testing and (as is the case in Ontario) policy mandates,
this paper raises issues that are of importance to those implementing existing
policy. Only through awareness of the nuances of competing financial literacy
narratives can front-line educators offer a more balanced approach to instruction.
As Arthur (2011, p. 214) argues, financial literacy education ought to “dispel the
12
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illusions that [perpetuates] the masking of political policies as ‘neutral’ economic
measures through consumerist language.” The creation and distribution of financial
literacy education curricula that counter the political myths described here (for
example, Pinto & Coulson, 2012) are a possible way for teachers to address these
issues in classrooms.
Finally, this paper points to several areas for future research. Research on
the political rhetoric and dynamics of financial literacy education in other
jurisdictions would contribute to a better understanding of international politics. As
well, further cross-jurisdictional research on how financial literacy education policy
affect individual and collective perceptions would shed light on the power of the
political rhetoric. Finally, as Kvernbekk (2011) suggests is the case among
practitioners, further study and clarification of the concept of evidence in education
policy should be conducted. While Kvernbekk’s (2011) focus is on practitioner use
of evidence, similar problems (beyond the scope of this paper) exist in the
application of evidence to policy production and these warrant clarification and
study.
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